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Abstract
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The fact that developing countries do not have carbon 
emission caps under the Kyoto Protocol has led to the 
current interest in high-income countries in border taxes 
on the “virtual” carbon content of imports. The authors 
use Global Trade Analysis Project data and input-output 
analysis to estimate the flows of virtual carbon implicit 
in domestic production technologies and the pattern of 
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international trade. The results present striking evidence 
on the wide variation in the carbon-intensiveness of trade 
across countries, with major developing countries being 
large net exporters of virtual carbon. The analysis suggests 
that tax rates of $50 per ton of virtual carbon could lead 
to very substantial effective tariff rates on the exports of 
the most carbon-intensive developing nations. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
A key provision of the Kyoto Protocol is that signatories take on legally binding caps on 
their carbon emissions if they are in ‘Annex 1’ to the protocol (essentially all high income 
and transition economies), while non-Annex 1 countries (developing countries) do not 
have caps. This has potential consequences for trade competitiveness and carbon leakage, 
and countries with caps may consider taxing the carbon content of imports from countries 
without caps to level the playing the field – indeed, the Waxman-Markey and Boxer-
Kerry bills currently before the US Congress, aimed at instituting a system of cap and 




Taxing carbon content at the border is potentially trade-distorting, with associated losses 
in efficiency and welfare for trading countries. Moreover, unilateral carbon taxation at 
the border may invite retaliation and could damage the multilateral trading system under 
the WTO. This motivates our study: we measure the bilateral flows of carbon implicit in 
international trade, and then calculate how large the effective tariff rate associated with a 




 – could be for major high income and developing countries. 
Our main findings are that the carbon intensiveness of exports is very high in many large 
developing countries, that there is wide variation in intensiveness across countries and 
sectors, and that imposition of a border tax could lead to substantial effective tariff rates 
on imports from developing countries – for example an average tariff rate of 10.3% on 
Chinese imports to the US if carbon is taxed at $50 per ton of CO2. 
 
Our analysis extends recent work, in particular Peters and Hertwich (2008),  by (i) 
constructing a country-by-country matrix of flows of carbon embodied in international 
trade, (ii) disaggregating carbon intensities to the sector and country level, (iii) linking the 
analysis of carbon flows in international trade to the literature on border tax adjustments, 
and (iv) estimating how large the taxes could be if virtual carbon were taxed at the border 
in major economies. Ours is a partial equilibrium analysis, and it is worth noting recent 
work by Mattoo et al. (2009a, 2009b) which employs a general equilibrium framework to 
analyze the impacts of taxing carbon, including border taxes, on exports of manufactured 
goods by large developing countries. 
 
The remainder of the  paper is organized as follows. We first  review the concept of 
embodied or virtual carbon and discuss previous efforts to estimate the amount of carbon 
that is (implicitly) traded between countries. We then outline the basic input-output 
framework that is used to model the carbon flows implicit in trade. Section 4 details the 
data employed. Section 5 lays out the relevant trade theory, as well considerations of 
                                                 
1 Note that in the current climate negotiations some countries have questioned whether carbon should be 
taxed where it is emitted or where it is consumed. Our analysis of the trade literature below shows this to be 
a non-issue – the logic of taxing consumption of carbon is that taxes would need to be imposed on all 
consumption, including on the carbon content of imports. 
2 See, for example, Velázquez (2006), Chapaquin et al. (2006) and Guan and Hubuecek (2007).   3 
WTO compatibility  and ethical concerns, followed by presentation of the empirical 
results in Section 6. The final section assesses policy implications and concludes. 
 
2.  Virtual Carbon and Its Measurement 
 
A growing number of anlayses have sought to examine the extent to which carbon is 
embodied in the international trade of goods and services either with an emphasis on a 
single country, notably China, trading with the rest of the world (Helm et al. 2007; Pan et 
al. 2008; Peters et al. 2008; Andrews et al. 2008) or all countries (with some aggregation 
for blocs of smaller countries) trading with one another (Ahmad and Wyckoff, 2003; 
Peters and Hertwich, 2008). Typically, these papers employ some form of input-output 
(IO) analysis (see, Miller and Blair, 1985; Førsund, 1985) to examine not only how 
economic sectors that comprise individual economies buy from and sell goods to one 
another but also how these sectors (or economies) then trade with the rest of the world. 
Importantly, embodied within these goods is the carbon that was released or emitted in 
the course of their production. The idea then, in existing studies, is to track this virtual 
carbon as the goods wend their way through the global economy, and ultimately in some 
shape or form are consumed.  
 
Studies differ as to how detailed a carbon trail is analyzed. Delgado (2007) provides an 
assessment of the carbon intensity of the export mix of European Union (EU) members. 
Peters and Hertwich (2008) look at both sides of the coin by examining the carbon 
embodied in the imports of a country (or regional trading bloc) as well as its exports (see, 
in addition, Ahmad and Wyckoff, 2003). This bilateral trade input-output (BTIO) 
approach can be contrasted with the multi-regional input-output approach (MRIO) (Peters, 
2008; Wiedmann et al. 2008). In essence, the BTIO approach only accounts for emissions 
in the exporting country. By contrast, the MRIO allocates to the consuming country all of 
the virtual carbon produced over the entire chain of production (across sectors and across 
countries) for a final consumption good. It is, of course, an empirical question as to how 
crucial this distinction is in practice. Ultimately, however, a critical consideration may be 
the specific analytical use of the different approaches. This is an issue to which we return 
later in this paper. 
 
How large are these flows of virtual carbon? What is the difference between the amount 
of carbon that countries such as the US and China, or trading blocs such as the European 
Union, produce and consume? On the one hand, Peters and Hertwich (2008) find that 
(taken as group) the production emissions of those countries which make up Annex B of 
the Kyoto Protocol are roughly 5 percent less than consumption emissions. Ahmad and 
Wyckoff (2003) reach a similar conclusion for OECD countries (circa 1995) taken as a 
bloc. On the other hand, these findings mask considerable variation between countries 
(within these highly aggregated groupings). Furthermore, captured within this calculation 
of net difference is a process whereby the majority of countries are exporting embodied 
emissions in substantial quantities. However, these same countries are also importing 
considerable amounts of carbon embodied in other goods that they consume. Looking at 
the overall carbon balance for a country masks a considerable amount of ebb and flow. 
Ahmad and Wyckoff (2003) note that the total amount of internationally traded carbon is   4 
comparable in size to (and in many cases greater than) the production emissions in many 
individual countries. 
 
Calculating the balance of trade in virtual carbon has been focal to many of these 
contributions. In this context it is worth noting that the broader idea of an ‘ecological 
balance of payments’ is not new. Atkinson and Hamilton (2003),  for example, use 
international  trade data in an IO-type framework to derive the demand for natural 
resource rents attributable to any given country’s final consumption (see also Proops and 
Atkinson, 1998, Proops et al. 1999 and Bailey and Clark, 2000, in a computable general 
equilibrium, or CGE, setting).
3,4
 
 But arguably more important are the broader policy 
implications of this work. For Peters and Hertwich (2008), this is envisaged in terms of 
the  carbon  leakage problem and the construction of consumption-based carbon 
inventories as a building block in the response to this challenge (see, for example, Peters 
and Hertwich, 2008). Similarly, Helm et al. (2007) use their analysis to recast the story of 
the UK’s carbon emissions record since 1990 (see, in addition, Wiedmann et al. 2008).  
To date few studies appear to have linked the results of the type of IO analysis described 
above to specific types of carbon reduction policy such as carbon taxation (although see 
Delgado, 2008, which looks at the likely burden which might fall on the EU’s traded 
goods sectors in this context). Nevertheless, a number of papers have examined such 
aspects in both theory and practice (e.g. Ismer and Neuhoff, 2007; Fischer and Fox, 2009) 
or used  CGE models to simulate the impacts of policy changes (e.g. Babiker and 
Rutherford, 2005; Fischer and Fox, 2009; Mattoo et al. 2009a, 2009b). In what follows, 
therefore, we discuss our findings in relation to the specific question of taxing virtual 
carbon at the border. Before doing this we outline the model and methods that we use to 
generate our results. 
 
3.  The Input-Output Model 
 
This section sketches the matrix algebra underlying the empirical results in this paper. 
This draws on a body of existing knowledge including Peters (2008) (but see Miller and 
Blair, 1985, for an earlier exposition of IO analysis in a multi-regional context). In what 
follows, the notation refers to the case of m  regions (or countries) and k  sectors. 
Superscripts indicate regions and subscripts indicate sectors. When either superscripts or 
subscripts have a pair of numbers, the pair should be interpreted as indicating ‘from-to’ 
flows. So, for example, 
12
34 p  indicates exports of intermediate goods from sector 3 in 
region 1 to sector 4 in region 2.
 
                                                 
3 In other contexts, Pedersen (1993) has used an IO framework to analyse net exports of transboundary 
(“acid rain”) pollution in Denmark vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Young (1996) examines the relative 
pollution intensity of traded (export-oriented) sectors and non-traded sectors in the Brazilian economy.  
4 Another prominent way of thinking about the links between countries in this way is the ‘ecological 
footprint’. This describes the extent to which a particular country (or region) is reliant on resources from 
elsewhere to support domestic economic activity (Rees and Wackernagel, 1994). In the carbon example, 
these needs can be expressed in a number of ways such as the land required to grow the equivalent biofuel. 
If this required area is larger than the area actually available to that country, then in this sense the country 
has an ecological deficit. Turner et al. (2007) provide an indication of how the ecological footprints 
standpoint relates to the IO approach.    5 
 
Single Region or Country 
 
Consider a region (or country) denoted by r. Input-output analysis begins with a simple 
balance of monetary flows (both within and ‘to and from’ this economy): 
 
r r r r r r m e y x A x − + + =                 (1) 
 
where:   x
r is a k-dimensional vector of total output with each of the k element indicating 
a sector’s output; 
 
A
r  is the matrix of inter-industry trade of intermediate products (including 
imported ones), where each element 
r
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ij b are 
region r’s sales of intermediate goods from sector i to sector j; 
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rs r e e  is a k-dimensional vector representing the sum of exports from 




sr r e m is the s the sum of exports from all regions (other than r) to region 
r: i.e. region r’s imports. 
 
Removing imports from the system we obtain: 
 
r rr r rr r e y x A x + + = ,                 (2) 
 
where:   ∑ − =
s
sr r rr w y y  (where  w
sr  indicates region r  imports of final consumption 




sr r rr H A A  (where  H
sr  is the kxk  matrix of region r  imports of 
intermediate goods from region s). 
 
Domestic carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions can then be estimated as follows: 
 
( ) ( )
r rr rr r r r r e y A I f x f z + − = =
−1
' ' ,             (3) 
   6 
where f
 r is a k-dimensional vector with each element representing the emission intensity 
of each industry’s output. Emissions z
r occur domestically to produce both the domestic 
component of final consumption and total exports. 
 
Multiple Regions or Countries: The Bilateral Trade Input-Output (BTIO) Model 
 
It is possible to use matrix algebra to represent the world’s m regions in one compact 





 r provided in the single country 
case, define the following: 
 

































  The (m×k)×(m×k) matrix of domestically produced intermediate consumption, A: 
 



































































































                                                 
5 Note that here, and in the following expressions, 0 indicates a k-dimensional vector of zeroes.   7 































Broadly analogous to the single country case, the main national accounting identity in the 
BTIO model is: 
 
E Y AX X + + =  
 
It follows that: 
 
( ) ( ) E Y A I X + − =
−1  
 
The matrix of world emissions necessary to support (global) final demand can then be 
estimated as: 
 
( ) ( ) E Y A I F ZBT + − =
−1 '                 (4) 
 
The  ij
th  element of the m×m  ZBT  matrix represents region i’s emissions necessary to 
support the production of goods sold to region j. The diagonal elements of ZBT are simply 
domestic emissions necessary to produce domestic final demand, while the off diagonal 
elements are the emissions of region i necessary to produce exports from region i to 
region  j. The sum of the elements of each row is total emissions produced in the 
corresponding region. The sum of the elements of each column is total emissions 
(domestic emissions plus foreign emissions to produce imports) commanded by the 
corresponding country’s demand. 
 
Multiple Regions or Countries: The Multi-Region Input-Output (MRIO) Model 
 
The BTIO method to estimate emissions, and virtual carbon, does not take into account 
the fact that exports from region i to region j are made possible, among other things, by 
imports of region i from say region k. A more sophisticated method to estimate total 
emissions (including imports of virtual carbon) is through the use of multi regional input-
output (MRIO) analysis. 
 
To reiterate, a key feature of MRIO is that it differentiates between exports that go to 
final consumption and exports that go to intermediate consumption in the importing 
country. In the MRIO model intermediate imports are endogenized, whereas in the BTIO 
model they are exogenous (that is, they are treated as components of final demand). We 
define the following: 
 
  The k-dimensional vector of region r’s exports of final consumption goods to region s, 
denoted w


































































  The  k×k  matrix of intermediate goods and services traded between region r  and 


















































ij x h p =  and 
rs
ij h are region r’s sales of intermediate goods from sector i to 
region s’s sector j 
 



































Note that E=PX+W. The MRIO and the BTIO models differ in the way they identify 
exports  therefore. This, in turn,  has implications  for  the way emissions, and thereby 
virtual carbon, are then allocated across countries and sectors. It is worth noting that 
while the BTIO and MRIO approaches both yield the same total emissions  from 
production in each country, the virtual carbon embodied in domestic final demand differs 
country by country in the two models –  this follows from the different treatment of 
intermediate imports in the two approaches. 
 
In the MRIO approach expression (4) can be rewritten as: 
   9 
( ) ( ) W Y P A I F ZMR + − − =
−1 '                (5) 
 
Analogous  to the case of the BTIO model, the ij
th  element of the m×m  ZMR  matrix 
represents emissions in country i  necessary to support demand of final consumption 
goods in country j. Unlike the BTIO model, virtual carbon flows from i to j include 
emissions not directly associated with trade between i and j. In fact, these virtual flows 
include emissions that have been exported from i to regions other than j and from there 
where exported to j. 
 
The key difference between MRIO and BTIO is that endogenizing intermediate trade 
results in full measurement of all indirect flows of carbon through trade of intermediate 
goods. So, for example, the diagonal entry in the ZMR matrix includes domestic emissions 
linked to production of an intermediate good that is exported to another country, which in 
turn produces an intermediate good that is imported back into the original country. Off-
diagonal row entries represent total emissions virtually exported to a given country 
(county j for example), including emissions to produce intermediate goods that are used 
in a third country, which are then exported as intermediate goods to country j.  In contrast, 
the BTIO approach measures only the domestic emissions required to supply domestic 
final demand in the diagonal entry of the ZBT matrix, while the off-diagonal entry for 
country j represents only the emissions in the producing country associated with exports, 
both intermediate and final, to country j. 
 
In principle, therefore, the MRIO approach yields a more complete accounting of the 
flows of virtual carbon between countries than BTIO. The cost of this more complete 
accounting is that it is difficult to associate virtual carbon flows with bilateral trade flows, 
which is where the BTIO approach would be more appropriate. Accordingly, in what 
follows we use MRIO where complete accounting is needed, and BTIO where accounting 
linked to specific trade flows is needed. 
 
 
4.  Data 
 
The data that we use in what follows are from version 7 of the Global Trade Analysis 
Project (GTAP) database for the year 2004 (Dimaramam, 2006). The GTAP data, widely 
used for computable general equilibrium (CGE) modeling, are available for 106 countries 
and regions and 57 sectors covering agriculture, industry and services. It includes IO, 
trade and CO2 emissions data, among others. In the analysis that follows, however, these 
GTAP data are aggregated to 15 countries and regions and 19 sectors. Arguably this 
allows for enough detail without overcomplicating the analysis unnecessarily. 
Abbreviations for the countries and the regions discussed in tables, figures and results are 
outlined in an annex to this paper. 
 
While the data in GTAP differentiates imports by use (i.e. final demand vs. intermediate 
consumption), these do not specify the country of origin. Because of this, in this paper, 
we  use the GTAP trade data to estimate the proportion of intermediate (and final 
consumption) goods and services that come from a particular country assuming the share   10 
is the same as the share of imports from that country over total imports. Denoting, as 
above, H
rs as the matrix of intermediate goods and services traded between region r and 
regions s, we can express the imports of region s as: 
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We can then calculate the elements of H
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Note, however, that CO2  emissions in GTAP are limited to those from fossil fuel 
consumption alone. Clearly, a fuller picture of virtual carbon would need to include 
emissions from other greenhouse gases and CO2 emissions from agriculture, land-use 
change and other processes. It is important also to understand how trade in energy goods 
(such as coal or crude oil) is treated in this analysis. In the IO approach, carbon is 
accounted for when it is emitted in a production process. This means that exports of crude 
oil, for example, are measured in terms of how much carbon was emitted in its drilling, 
pumping, transporting and processing but not in terms of how much carbon the oil 
contains. The latter is only measured when (and where) the oil is actually burned and the 
carbon released. 
 
Finally, because the GTAP data are measured in dollars at market exchange rates, it is 
worth considering whether the (relatively) low price of non-tradables in developing 
countries could distort the analytical results
6
 
. Since the sectors with the highest carbon 
intensity are typically the big traded sectors (metals, minerals, petroleum, chemicals, 
cement, and pulp and paper) this would not appear to be a concern. Moreover, for highly 
carbon-intensive non-tradables, the low price of these goods (resulting from the use of 
market exchange rates) is fully offset by a correspondingly high emission coefficient. 
When we wish to employ values for GNI as a numeraire below, we use both PPP and 
market exchange rate values. 
5.  Theoretical, Legal and Ethical Considerations for Border Taxation 
 
As noted in the Introduction, our main interest in employing IO analysis to trace the 
flows of virtual carbon in international trade is to examine the potential size of border 
taxes on virtual carbon. It is important, therefore, to consider the theory of border taxation, 
                                                 
6 As noted in World Bank (2008), production in a developing economy will typically be underestimated if 
market exchange rates are used to compare its value with that in high-income economies. Because 
developing economies tend to have relatively lower wages leading to lower prices for non-traded goods and 
services, a unit of local currency has greater purchasing power within a developing economy than it does in 
the global market. It follows that conversion to an international currency (e.g. the US dollar) for the sake of 
comparison results in a distortion. PPPs adjust for differences in price levels between economies, which 
may not be reflected in market exchange rates, at least in the short run.    11 
questions of carbon leakage linked to this taxation, the efficiency properties of border 
taxation,  the WTO compatibility of border taxes on virtual carbon, and some of the 
ethical concerns that might arise from the use of these taxes. 
 
Lockwood and Whalley (2008) point out that the discussion of trade taxes on carbon 
content should be rooted in a long-standing literature on border tax adjustments. One of 
the basic results in this literature is that, as long as tax rates (ad valorem) are uniform 
across sectors, then switching back and forth between taxing by origin and taxing by 
destination is not trade-distorting (see, for example, Whalley, 1979). Price levels and/or 
exchange rates between the trading countries will respond to the tax, but the volume of 
trade and relative prices of traded goods will not change.  
 
Even if tax rates are not uniform across sectors, Lockwood and Whalley go on to note, as 
long as there are equilibrating factors at the sector level, such as flexible wage rates, then 
the same non-trade-distorting result will hold. This seems unlikely to hold in real-world 
settings. Grossman (1980) looks at the more complex issue of trade in intermediate as 
well as final goods, and concludes that a uniform product tax is trade-distorting under the 
origin principle, but trade neutral under the destination principle. 
 
The incentive effects of taxing virtual carbon depend critically on the slope of the 
demand schedule for the good being taxed. If demand for the good is infinitely elastic 
then taxing virtual carbon is equivalent to taxing emissions at source –  the loss of 
producer surplus (deadweight loss) under the virtual carbon tax is precisely equal to the 
cost of abatement which would be incurred by the producer under an equivalent pollution 
tax (that is, a tax which produces the same quantity of emissions reduction). If the 
demand for the good is perfectly inelastic then the tax has no effect on levels of 
production or emissions. Intermediate cases for demand elasticities would have the 
obvious effect – the steeper the demand schedule the less effective is the tax on virtual 
carbon. 
 
Fischer and Fox (2009) provide a very useful partial-equilibrium analysis of various 
options for treating the potential competitiveness impacts of a carbon tax. These options 
include a tax on imports, a tax rebate on exports and the sum of these two treatments. The 
latter corresponds to a ‘full border adjustment’ and which, they note, is equivalent to 
taxing by destination: i.e. a consumption tax. The authors find that each of these border 
tax treatments increases domestic production (and therefore, implicitly, domestic 
emissions) relative to the no-border-tax case where production emissions are taxed 
(regardless of whether produced goods are for export or not). Importantly, from the 
perspective of dealing with the climate change problem, the effect on global emissions is 
ambiguous - this depends crucially upon the relative size of the elasticities of supply and 
demand, as well as the carbon intensities of domestic and imported goods. 
 
There is  also an important information  dimension to the question of instrument 
effectiveness. In a world of perfect information, where the virtual carbon content of each 
good is known with precision, the efficiency of taxing virtual carbon for a good whose 
demand is perfectly elastic would be the same as the first best instrument: i.e. taxing   12 
emissions at source. In reality, the virtual carbon content of any good can only be known 
imperfectly and this information may not be freely available. Hence, there is reason to 
expect that taxing virtual carbon may not be as efficient as the first best instrument even 
if the demand for the good is perfectly elastic. 
 
Another important consideration in taxing virtual carbon at the border is World Trade 
Organization (WTO) compatibility. As long as each unit of virtual carbon – whether 
domestic or imported – is taxed at the same rate, there is at least potential compatibility 
with the national treatment clauses of the GATT. Demaret and Stewardson (1994), Goh 
(2004) and Ismer and Neuhoff (2007) look at this question in more detail. The issues are 
complex – and depend at least as much on the minutiae of specific proposals as broader 
points of principle and practice –  and perhaps not surprisingly contributors to this 
discussion have drawn divergent conclusions. De Cendra (2006) concludes that the WTO 
compatibility of a border tax on carbon, as proposed in the EU for example, will not be 
determined definitively until a case goes to the Appellate Body of the WTO. 
 
The BTIO approach illustrated earlier provides information that, in principle, could be 
used to calculate a ‘carbon-added’ tax. In practice, inevitable inaccuracies in data, not to 
mention the inherent limitations of a Leontief production function, would limit the 
efficiency of the tax instrument for these traded goods, as noted above, and could provide 
the basis for a dispute at the WTO if virtual carbon taxes were applied to international 
trade. In other words, accurate measurement of virtual carbon is likely to be highly 
complex and subject to dispute, especially if conducted in a comprehensive way that 
taxes all virtual carbon. 
 
Within this context, Barrett (2008) sounds a skeptical note about the credibility and 
acceptability of taxing virtual carbon,  within a broader skepticism of prospects for 
success in negotiating international agreements which mandate economy-wide carbon 
reductions.  In doing so, however, he speculates as to whether international deals to 
reduce carbon in particular (carbon intensive) economic sectors might incorporate trade 
restrictions as one means of increasing participation and ensuring compliance. Clearly, 
‘leveling the playing field’ in several sectors represents a rather piece-meal approach, 
whereas taxing virtual carbon is a part of a comprehensive approach to this problem. For 
Barrett, however, a critical issue is what approach could command the necessary global 
consensus to make trade restrictions both credible (as a form of punishment) and 
acceptable (as it might be more likely to be if combined with positive measures such as 
financial assistance to developing countries). 
 
Ambiguities about WTO compatibility aside, some commentators have identified concern 
about the possibly divisive influence of proposals to tax virtual carbon on future climate 
change negotiations (see, for example, Cosbey, 2008). Broader still, although relevant to 
framing such concerns, are equity considerations. Miller (2007), for example, argues for 
the principle that nations can be judged to be responsible for damages past and present. 
While taxing a bad is potentially welfare-improving at the global level, if poorer 
countries end up financing a global public good as a result then this raises severe ethical   13 
concerns, especially since the poorest countries have made minimal contributions to the 
source of the problem. 
 
 
6.  Empirical Results 
 
Our IO analysis yields a rich array of results regarding the composition of trade in virtual 
carbon. We first use the MRIO approach to summarize total flows of carbon, in total and 
normalized to GDP, by country. We follow this with an examination of the composition 
of trade in virtual carbon using the BTIO approach. As noted above, the key advantage of 
the BTIO approach is that it allows the matching of bilateral trade flows to their carbon 
content. 
 
Turning to the results for the MRIO approach to virtual carbon, Figures 1 and 2a and 2b 
decompose flows of carbon by country. The virtual carbon – from domestic sources – 
required to produce domestic final demand is represented by the dark bars. Gray bars 
represent the virtual carbon – from foreign sources – embodied in the country’s final 
demand.  The outline bar measures how much carbon was actually emitted in all 
production processes inside the country. Note that these are emissions in the production 
sectors, meaning that household and government emissions are excluded. This is not to 
argue that these emissions are unimportant in the bigger picture of understanding the 
contribution to climate change  of different economic sectors. However,  since these 
emissions are not ‘virtually traded’ they fall outside the domain of analysis in this paper. 
 
In Figure 1 we see –  as expected – that the big emitters of carbon from production 
processes are the US, the EU, China and the aggregate of other middle income countries 
(excluding China, India, Brazil, Mexico, Russia and South Africa). Note that if the 
outline bar (emissions from total production) is higher than the sum of the dark and grey 
bars (domestic and foreign virtual carbon in domestic final demand), then the country is a 
net exporter of virtual carbon. The main net exporters of virtual carbon are China, Russia 
and other middle income countries, while the main net importers are the EU, USA and 
Japan. 
 
Figures 2a and 2b look at carbon intensity of consumption (solid bar) and production 
(outline bar) by normalizing the numbers from Figure 1 to the GNI measured at market 
exchange rates and PPP. From a consumption perspective, the countries consuming the 
most (domestic and foreign virtual carbon) emissions per dollar of income are Russia, 
China, India and South Africa. Adjusting by PPP exchange rates increases the relative 
importance of the USA (now fourth) and diminishes that of India. To understand these 
numbers, consider India: one dollar of (PPP) income results in 0.4 tons of consumption 
driven emissions. This is much lower than China (almost 0.7) but higher than EU15 
(0.26). So income growth in India will result in a higher 'demand' for emissions than 
income growth in the EU (assuming constant technology and PPP exchange rates). This 
reflects both India's production patterns but also the characteristics of India's demand for 
imported goods. 
   14 
Turning now to bilateral trade flows (i.e. using the findings from the BTIO approach as 
discussed), Figures 3 and 4 break down the sources of flows of virtual carbon imported 
into the EU and the US. In terms of virtual carbon imports, the EU imports large amounts 
from China, the US, economies in transition and Russia, with smaller flows from India 
and Japan (Figure 3). The US imports significant flows of virtual carbon from China, the 
EU, and Canada, with smaller flows from Mexico, Russia and Japan (Figure 4). As seen 
in Figure 5, the major destinations for Chinese exports of virtual carbon are the EU, the 
US and Japan, with smaller flows to India, economies in transition, Mexico, Canada and 
Russia. 
 
The bilateral trade IO analysis also lends itself to analysis of the net flows of virtual 
carbon between countries, as presented in Table 1. China has large net exports to the EU, 
the US and Japan, while the EU is a big net importer from other middle income countries, 
economies in transition and the US. The US is also a major net importer from other 
middle income countries. These bilateral flows of carbon provide the basis for estimating 
the effective tariff rate associated with any particular level of a border tax on virtual 
carbon. 
 
Estimates of border taxes on virtual carbon 
 
Table 2 contains our key results regarding the potential size of taxes on virtual carbon 
trade. It presents the effective tariff rate that exporting countries would face on their 
goods and services if all importing countries placed a $50/ton CO2 tax on the virtual 
carbon content of imports. This illustrative carbon price is in line with recent experience, 
given that emissions permits in the EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) traded as high as 
€35 in 2008. 
 
Reading these results by column tells us about the (effective) tariff burden that the USA, 
for example, would place on the imports that it receives from its trading partners such as 
Russia and the European Union. This burden is, in turn, expressed in Table 2 as a 
percentage of the value of the total imports from that particular country (or region) to the 
USA. The effective tariff rate on trade in this example would vary from a high of 10.4% 
and 10.3% on imports from Russia and China respectively through to 8.9% for South 
Africa, 7.9% for India, to a low of 1.2% for the European Union. The final value in the 
column for the USA is the average tariff placed on the imports received from all of its 
trading partners (3.1%).  
 
Reading these results by row, by contrast, tells us about the tariff that a given exporter 
would face in each of the countries where its goods are destined. In the case of China, for 
example, its exports are subject to an effective tariff rate (based on the virtual carbon in 
those exports) of 10.5% for those exports consumed in the European Union, 10.4% for 
Japan and 10.3% for the US. The final number in the row for China is the average tariff 
that its exports to its trading partners would face, 10.7%. As a comparison, US exports to 
other countries would face a trade-weighted average tariff rate of 3.1% and EU exports 
would face a rate of 1.2%. 
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As can be seen from Table 2, these effective tariff rates vary widely across countries. 
This, in turn, is the result of two factors: the sectoral composition of trade and the carbon 
intensity of different sectors in different countries. Clearly, a uniformly higher (lower) 
virtual carbon tax would uniformly boost (shrink) these percentages. 
 
Table 3 shows the effective tariff rate that would be faced by country and sector if the 
virtual carbon content of traded goods were taxed at $50 per ton of CO2. Average tax 
rates, as reported in Table 2, give the big picture, but it is at the sector level that the 
economic impacts of virtual carbon taxes will be felt. The large developing countries 
highlighted in Table 2 have tradable sectors that would be particularly hard-hit by a tax 
on virtual carbon – chemicals, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, and other mineral products. 
‘Other mining’ products are particularly carbon-intensive in Mexico and South Africa, as 
are paper products produced in China and India. Tradable sectors such as chemicals, 
ferrous metals and mineral products are highly carbon intensive in low income countries. 
 
Modeling the wider economic impacts of taxing virtual carbon at the border is beyond the 
scope of this paper, since this would involve general equilibrium effects. But our analysis 
gives a strong sense of what would drive these general equilibrium effects (for which, see 
Mattoo et al. (2009a and 2009b). 
 
7.  Conclusions 
 
The IO analysis of the flows of virtual carbon in international trade, as presented in the 
figures and Table 1, is of inherent interest. It shows that the combination of trade volumes, 
trade composition, and the carbon intensity of production across countries results in very 
large net flows of virtual carbon from the major developing countries to high income 
countries. This finding suggests that taxing virtual carbon at the border in high income 
countries could result in significant effective carbon tariff rates on developing country 
exports, a suggestion that is borne out in Tables 2 and 3. 
 
Our main finding is that if virtual carbon is taxed at $50 per ton of CO2, a level of tax that 
has already been experienced in the European ETS, then the effective tariff rates faced by 
developing country exports is significant, up to 10% of the value of the average export 
bundle, and two to three times this level for specific tradable sectors. This, combined with 
our analysis of the border tax literature, suggests that border taxes on virtual carbon will 
be trade distorting in the sense that the volume and composition of international trade will 
change as a result, with associated losses in efficiency and welfare, particularly in 
developing countries. 
 
At least four other perspectives on our findings are possible: 
 
First, from the perspective of global climate change policy, the incentive to producers 
provided by taxing virtual carbon may be welfare-improving if global emissions decline.  
 
Second, from a purely trade perspective, it is clear that unilateral moves to tax virtual 
carbon at the border would exacerbate trade tensions at a time when the international   16 
trading system is under severe stress  –  the potential for a trade war should not be 
discounted. 
 
Third, the WTO compatibility of border taxes on virtual carbon is untested. Treating all 
tons of virtual carbon the same, whether from domestic or international sources,  is 
potentially compatible with the national treatment clauses of the WTO, but until there is a 
case brought before the Appellate Body and a decision reached, the question of WTO 
compatibility is unclear. 
 
Fourth, while taxing a bad is potentially welfare-improving at the global level, the fact 
that developing countries could end up financing a global public good as a result raises 
ethical concerns, particularly when low income countries have historically made minimal 
contributions to the source of the problem. 
 
Finally, a cautionary note. All  countries have a major stake in ensuring that the 
international trade regime continues to be open, fair and rules-based. Our analysis shows 
that unilateral border taxes on virtual carbon in high income countries would be harmful 
to developing country trade. Financial transfers from high income to developing countries 
could potentially offset some of all of the welfare losses. But opening the door to border 
taxes for climate could potentially lead to a proliferation of trade measures dealing with 
other areas where the competitive playing field is viewed as uneven – corroding the very 
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Annex: Abbreviations Used 
 
BRA  Brazil 
CAN  Canada 
CHN  China 
E15  European Union 15 
eit  Economies in transition 
IND  India 
JPN  Japan 
liy  Low income countries 
MEX  Mexico 
RUS  Russia 
USA  USA 
xhy  Other high income (mostly oil exporters) 
xmy  Other middle income 
xx1  Other Annex 1 
ZAF  South Africa 
 
All data are for 2004. 
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Source: authors 
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Figure 2a – Virtual-C intensity in production, domestic final demand, and imports (tons 
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Note: virtual carbon flows have been estimated using the MRIO approach. 
Source: authors 
 
Figure 2b – Virtual-C intensity in production, domestic final demand, and imports (tons 
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Note: virtual carbon flows have been estimated using the MRIO approach. 
Source: authors 
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Note: virtual carbon imports have been estimated using the BTIO approach. 
Source: authors 
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Note: virtual carbon imports have been estimated using the BTIO approach. 
Source: authors 
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Note: virtual carbon exports have been estimated using the BTIO approach. 
Source: authors   26 
 
Table 1. Net imports of virtual-C (1,000 tons of CO2) 
  Imports into: 
Exports 
from:                               
  BRA  CAN  CHN  E15  eit  IND  JPN  liy  MEX  RUS  USA  xhy  Xmy  xx1  ZAF 
BRA    40    10,318  11    1,707    1,873    5,840  331    822   
CAN        11,831      3,379        6,516  548    964   
CHN  10,630  17,841    294,101  28,580  27,377  157,990  38,143  29,189    261,587  162,077  96,499  37,115  5,651 
E15                               
eit    1,364    127,128      1,974    158    8,661  10,506    9,589   
IND  559  1,885    38,109  323    2,973  7,783  198    21,269  6,026  3,768  2,075   
JPN        9,452          74      9,148       
liy  91  741    35,219  514    2,651    412    13,609      3,041   
MEX    434    6,726                    868   
RUS  1,890  2,768  6,464  109,970  39,493  4,903  12,861  8,221  3,342    33,866  18,991  38,181  23,300   
USA        120,230      15,684    12,834      11,081    14,688   
xhy        33,637        3,542  1,193          1,472   
xmy  4,560  11,400    212,120  1,565    55,141  22,796  6,637    109,281  59,734    28,189   
xx1        26,627      5,601                 
ZAF  583  1,127    27,638  452  597  8,604  8,907  848  283  5,024  6,566  5,848  3,920   
Note: figures indicate that the column-country is a net importer of virtual-C from the row-country. Virtual carbon trade flows have been estimated using the BTIO approach. 
Source: authors   27 
 
Table 2. Average tariff on imports if virtual-C is taxed at $50/ton CO2 
  Imports into: 
Exports 
from: 
BRA  CAN  CHN  E15  eit  IND  JPN  liy  MEX  RUS  USA  xhy  xmy  xx1  ZAF  Average   
BRA  0.0%  3.4%  3.2%  3.2%  3.1%  2.8%  4.0%  2.8%  2.7%  2.6%  3.0%  3.9%  3.0%  3.7%  2.9%  3.1% 
CAN  4.5%  0.0%  3.4%  3.4%  3.2%  3.7%  3.2%  3.4%  2.8%  2.8%  2.6%  3.8%  2.9%  3.6%  3.0%  2.9% 
CHN  12.1%  10.5%  0.0%  10.5%  11.7%  13.4%  10.4%  11.0%  9.9%  10.0%  10.3%  11.0%  10.9%  11.1%  11.1%  10.7% 
E15  1.6%  1.1%  1.1%  0.0%  1.1%  1.3%  1.2%  1.2%  1.1%  1.1%  1.2%  1.3%  1.1%  1.2%  1.2%  1.2% 
eit  6.6%  4.1%  4.3%  4.0%  0.0%  5.1%  3.9%  4.5%  4.2%  4.4%  4.2%  5.2%  4.5%  4.6%  4.6%  4.2% 
IND  8.3%  7.8%  9.2%  7.7%  8.9%  0.0%  6.8%  8.5%  8.1%  8.7%  7.9%  7.0%  7.9%  8.5%  5.3%  7.8% 
JPN  1.4%  1.3%  1.5%  1.4%  1.5%  1.6%  0.0%  1.5%  1.4%  1.4%  1.2%  1.5%  1.4%  1.4%  1.3%  1.4% 
liy  8.2%  5.4%  5.7%  5.0%  5.6%  6.1%  4.7%  0.0%  5.1%  4.9%  5.0%  5.3%  5.7%  6.1%  7.0%  5.3% 
MEX  3.5%  2.1%  4.2%  4.0%  3.6%  10.8%  4.0%  4.9%  0.0%  4.1%  1.7%  4.6%  3.4%  4.0%  3.5%  2.3% 
RUS  18.0%  14.3%  12.4%  11.8%  13.9%  12.8%  11.3%  15.0%  14.7%  0.0%  10.4%  14.5%  13.6%  14.0%  15.9%  12.6% 
USA  3.3%  3.0%  3.1%  3.1%  3.4%  3.3%  3.0%  3.3%  2.8%  2.8%  0.0%  3.2%  2.9%  3.5%  3.2%  3.1% 
xhy  3.3%  2.3%  2.2%  2.3%  2.6%  2.2%  2.0%  2.3%  2.2%  2.5%  2.0%  0.0%  2.2%  2.4%  2.5%  2.2% 
xmy  6.3%  5.6%  5.0%  5.4%  5.8%  4.1%  4.1%  6.1%  5.3%  6.1%  4.5%  4.5%  0.0%  6.2%  5.1%  5.0% 
xx1  2.5%  2.1%  2.1%  2.1%  2.1%  3.2%  2.2%  2.3%  1.8%  1.8%  2.0%  2.3%  2.1%  0.0%  2.7%  2.1% 
ZAF  15.9%  10.1%  10.6%  9.8%  10.1%  11.5%  11.4%  9.0%  16.6%  7.9%  8.9%  12.4%  8.8%  10.2%  0.0%  9.9% 
Average  4.2%  3.0%  2.7%  4.3%  2.9%  4.2%  4.2%  4.2%  3.4%  3.2%  3.1%  4.1%  3.2%  3.1%  3.4%   
Note: Average figures represent the trade-weighted average tariff faced by the exporting country (row) or the average tariff imposed by the importing country (column). Virtual carbon trade  
flows have been estimated using the BTIO approach. 
Source: authors 
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Table 3. Effective tariff rates by sector and country if virtual-C is taxed at $50/ton CO2 
                               
 Sector  BRA  CAN  CHN  E15  eit  IND  JPN  liy  MEX  RUS  USA  xhy  xmy  xx1  ZAF 
Agriculture  2%  3%  6%  1%  4%  5%  2%  2%  2%  7%  3%  3%  3%  2%  6% 
Construction  1%  1%  11%  1%  2%  6%  1%  4%  1%  7%  1%  2%  4%  1%  6% 
Coal  1%  4%  18%  2%  8%  4%  0%  5%  0%  14%  3%  3%  3%  2%  6% 
Chemicals rubber and plastics  4%  5%  17%  2%  7%  12%  3%  14%  4%  27%  5%  5%  10%  2%  12% 
Electricity  5%  23%  126%  18%  33%  68%  14%  34%  39%  86%  44%  39%  50%  30%  159% 
Food processing  2%  2%  8%  1%  3%  5%  1%  2%  2%  8%  3%  2%  3%  2%  4% 
Final services  0%  1%  5%  0%  2%  2%  1%  3%  0%  5%  1%  1%  2%  1%  2% 
Natural gas  7%  8%  81%  1%  6%  7%  0%  4%  3%  10%  2%  0%  4%  3%  2% 
Gas distribution  8%  1%  156%  3%  8%  0%  0%  1%  5%  10%  4%  0%  5%  9%  322% 
Ferrous metals  9%  6%  23%  3%  12%  18%  4%  19%  7%  23%  6%  6%  15%  6%  29% 
Non ferrous metals  7%  7%  24%  2%  6%  21%  2%  10%  2%  21%  6%  2%  8%  7%  15% 
Mineral products etc  7%  4%  35%  3%  8%  28%  3%  17%  4%  23%  7%  8%  15%  6%  22% 
Crude oil  3%  4%  13%  2%  6%  3%  0%  1%  2%  5%  3%  1%  2%  1%  1% 
Other mining  5%  13%  12%  2%  6%  9%  3%  4%  33%  4%  4%  2%  5%  3%  20% 
Refined oil  2%  8%  12%  2%  3%  2%  1%  3%  9%  10%  5%  0%  10%  4%  13% 
Paper products etc  3%  4%  13%  1%  3%  20%  2%  7%  2%  5%  4%  3%  7%  2%  5% 
Services  1%  1%  5%  0%  2%  4%  1%  3%  2%  5%  1%  1%  3%  1%  3% 
Transport services  17%  12%  11%  4%  7%  8%  3%  11%  17%  22%  11%  5%  14%  4%  12% 
Other manufacturing  2%  1%  8%  1%  2%  7%  1%  3%  1%  13%  2%  2%  3%  1%  5% 
 
Note: Virtual carbon intensities have been estimated using the BTIO approach. 
Source: authors. 
 
 
 
 